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Abstract—Pivoting is a technique used by cyber attackers to
exploit the privileges of compromised hosts in order to reach
their final target. Existing research on countering this menace is
only effective for pivoting activities spanning within the internal
network perimeter. When applying existing methods to include
external traffic, the detection algorithm produces overwhelming
entries, most of which unrelated to pivoting. We address this
problem by identifying the major characteristics that are specific
to potentially malicious pivoting. Our analysis combines human
expertise with machine learning and is based on the inspection
of real network traffic generated by a large organization. The
final goal is the reduction of the unacceptable amounts of false
positives generated by the state of the art methods. This paper
paves the way for future researches aimed at countering the
critical menace of illegitimate pivoting activities.
Index Terms—Pivoting, Lateral Movement, Machine Learning,
Flow Inspection, Intrusion Detection
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the many advances in cybersecurity, the reality is
that existing systems are continuously breached. Motivated
attackers increasingly refine their strategies, and no enterprise
network can consider itself absolutely secure [1]. At the base
of many offensive campaigns is the technique of pivoting,
which allows attackers to exploit the privileges of compro-
mised hosts to reach their final target. As an example, consider
a network that can be accessed only through a VPN server:
by compromising this server, it is possible for an external
attacker to access every host in the given network. Detecting
these occurrences would prevent the attackers from expanding
their control in the target network (i.e., lateral movement)
to accomplish their objective. Hence, stopping the malicious
pivoting activities early in an attack campaign is of paramount
importance for the security of modern organizations.
Despite the critical role of pivoting detection, there is
limited prior work tackling this problem. To the best of our
knowledge, the only existing approach [2] is effective only for
pivoting activities that originate within a network. In fact, we
empirically apply this method on traffic coming from external
networks and found that over 99% of the “detected” pivoting
samples are not pivoting at all. This outlines a crucial problem
in state of the art, as pivoting activities can span over multiple
networks—which is especially true in recent times with an
increase of remote network accesses [3].
This paper addresses the issue of pivoting detection. We
provide a detailed study that serves as a basis to decrease
the amount of “false” pivoting activities detected by means
of the existing approach. We do not make any assumption on
the location or protocol involved for the pivoting activities,
and the only requirement is NetFlow analysis. To formalize
the scope of our work, we pose the following three research
questions which we shall answer:
1) Which phenomena are similar to pivoting?
2) Which NetFlow features are intrinsic to pivoting?
3) How to automatically reduce false positives?
Our proposal combines human expertise with machine learn-
ing methods. By manually inspecting the output of prior work
on real traffic data, we determine which ‘candidates’ represent
true pivoting activities. Then, we infer which traits are more
typical of true pivoting activities with respect to noisy results.
Finally, we combine our findings with machine learning to
identify features and feature combinations that are intrinsic to
true pivoting and the weight they should have in true pivoting
detection.
Our paper paves the way to more efficient and automatic
methods that can reliably detect pivoting occurring within
or originated beyond a given network. The remainder of
this paper is structured as follows. Section II compares this
paper with related works. Section III describes the application
scenario. Section IV presents our method. Section V is devoted
to the experimental evaluation, and conclusions are drawn in
Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Although many advanced cyberattacks exploit the technique
of pivoting (e.g., [4], [5]), we highlight the scarcity of pro-
posals that focus specifically on the detection of malicious
pivoting activities. Among the first efforts is the seminal work
by Valeur et al. [6], which leverages the correlation of alerts
generated by an Intrusion Detection System (IDS): the prob-
lem of this approach is that it requires the triggering of alerts
(as also done in [7]), whereas we operate on raw NetFlows [8].
A related area investigates malware propagation [9] by detect-
ing anomalous communication spikes, but their effectiveness
in large networks requires scenarios where hundreds of hosts
are involved – whereas typical pivoting activities span over
just a few selected devices. Some papers focus on pivoting
prevention by means of game-theory [10]–[12], but require the
complete restructuring of the entire network, and the attacker
may just deviate from the designed model to easily evade the
countermeasure. The proposal by Fawaz et al. [13] operates
on host-based data (similarly to [14]), which are prone to
manipulation by an expert attacker that is already controlling
some devices in the target network. A relevant study is the one
in [15] where graph-analytics techniques are applied to detect
malicious logins on individual machines, which cannot be used
to model pivoting activities because they span over multiple
hosts. The works in [16], [17] conceptualize pivoting attacks
but do not propose any original detection approach. Finally,
pivoting attacks can be detected as a side effect, but only when
performed through specific services, such as RDP [18].
In summary, with respect to state of the art, our paper
focuses on the detection of pivoting activities occurring any-
where in a given network. Our proposal is based just on Net-
Flow inspection. By applying machine learning algorithms, we
aim to reduce the (unacceptably high) rate of false positives.
III. PIVOTING SCENARIOS
We describe the concept of pivoting activities and the
intuition of existing pivoting detection methods, which form
the base of our analysis.
A. Pivoting Activities
Pivoting leverages the idea of using machines with priv-
ileged characteristics (e.g., the entry point of a network,
or dedicated ACL) to “connect” two hosts that would be
otherwise unreachable. Pivoting activities involve three actors:
the source (S), the pivoter (P ), and the target (T ).
We provide an example in Figure 1, representing a typical
setting where an organization network is accessible from the
Internet through an entry point host. In this context, remote
users (Sb or Sm in Figure 1) can access the network by
“pivoting” on such a host (P in Figure 1), which serves as a
stepping stone to reach the organization’s internal services (Tx
in Figure 1). As a consequence, all communications between
the remote users (the source) go through the pivoter host,
which forwards them to the final target. This workflow is
reversed when the target sends its responses back to the
corresponding source. It is obvious that such activities are not
malicious by definition. On the contrary, in such a situation,
(legitimate) pivoting activities are “expected” to happen.
Pivoting activities can span over more than three hosts,
which would represent scenarios with multiple pivoters. With-
out loss of generality, in the remainder of this paper, we focus
only on pivoting activities involving three hosts, as all results
can be easily extended to cover cases with longer pivoting
chains.
B. Existing Pivoting Detection Algorithm
Apruzzese et al. [2] proposed an algorithm that leverage
temporal graph-analytics to detect pivoting by analyzing Net-
Flow records. This data-type captures high-level information
on the network communications between two hosts, such as the
start of the transmissions and their duration and the amount of
exchanged bytes or packets. At the base of this algorithm are
two main intuitions that are used to model pivoting activities:
(i) all communications between S and T must go through P ;









Figure 1. Depiction of pivoting.
the communications from S. Hence, by modeling this time
constraint as a function of ε, it is possible to model pivoting
activities as “pairs of NetFlows linking S with P , and P with
T , that are separated by at most ε time units”. By optimally
tuning ε, such formalization was applied in [2] to detect
pivoting activities occurring in an internal network, obtaining
perfect accuracy as all results were indeed related to pivoting
activities.
However, we claim that this approach is not feasible when
considering external traffic. In such circumstances, the pivoter
host would receive millions of incoming connections from
thousands of external hosts in very short time frames. As
a consequence, even by considering very small values of ε,
the algorithm would output a considerable number of false
pivoting activities.
C. Preliminary Findings
We validate the infeasibility of [2] by applying their al-
gorithm to a real use case. We consider real network traffic
data on the Masaryk University campus, consisting of 23 GB
of NetFlow data collected throughout one working day. The
traffic includes both external and internal hosts. We run the
existing algorithm on this data by setting ε = 1 second, and we
obtained 90 774 pivoting activities. After manual inspection,
we determined that only 13 of these were true pivoting
activities, with a false positive rate of over 99.99%.
Such result confirms the crucial problem at the base of
our work, which we address in the next sections. Given the
unreliability of the results, in the remainder of this paper, we
will refer to the output of the detection algorithm as “pivoting
candidates”.
IV. METHODOLOGY
We aim to answer the three research questions posed in
Section I. We do so by looking at the resulting pivoting
candidates produced after the application of the algorithm
in [2] and using expert knowledge to determine which of
these pivoting candidates are actually pivoting. Then, we
inspect the true pivoting activities, and we try to discern
which characteristics captured by network flows could be used
to differentiate them from the false positives. This protocol
is typical in cybersecurity-related analyses [19]. Let us first
summarize our implementation of the algorithm.
The NetFlow collector of the considered network is set
to produce only unidirectional flows. Hence, we had to
convert these data into their bidirectional version (which is
an assumption of [2]). To accomplish this task we rely on
nfdump1. Only the flows with the duration and the number
of transferred packets and bytes in both directions bigger
than 0 are considered. We consider, in this work, pivoting
activities must have bidirectional communications, i.e., T has
to respond to S. Finally, we reorder the flows according to
their timestamp. We do not apply any additional filtering;
therefore, communications over all protocols and port numbers
are considered.
The pivoting candidate detection follows the algorithm from
[2]. Each flow f with a timestamp t is checked against all
the flows with the timestamp between t and t + ε, where ε
is the maximal command propagation delay tolerated by the
detection algorithm, in our case 1 second. This produces a set
of flow pairs. Then, each pair of flows (f1, f2) is considered
as a pivoting candidate if:
• the destination IP address of f1 is also the source IP
address of f2,
• destination IP address of f2 is not the source IP address
of f1,
• protocol and destination ports are the same for both f1
and f2.
The last criteria on the same protocol and destination ports
are motivated by the expectation that the same service, e.g.,
SSH, is used in S to P and P to T connections.
The execution of such implementation of the algorithm
yields 90 774 pivoting candidates.
A. Discovery of phenomena similar to pivoting
To answer the first research question, we need to inspect the
pivoting candidates and identify which candidates represent
potential pivoting activity and which represent other events.
We will use manual inspection of the candidates and expert
knowledge of network traffic and the environment. The manual
inspection is going to be highly situational and may rely on
the insider’s knowledge of the network.
The first features we are going to investigate are the destina-
tion ports and protocols, which are the same in both flows that
form a pivoting candidate. This would allow us to associate
pivoting candidates with network services and applications.
We expect to see potentially interesting samples on TCP ports
22 (SSH), 23 (Telnet), and 3389 (RDP), which are mostly
used for both benign and malicious remote access to network
hosts. Some network applications may display similar behavior
as pivoting, such as an SMTP during receiving and relaying
an email. In case we encounter pivoting candidates using such
ports and services, we will investigate if it is a suspicious
behavior or a common behavior of such a service.
The second feature we are going to inspect is the IP
addresses involved in a candidate event. Namely, we are
interested in the location of the actors, e.g., if it is in the
1https://github.com/phaag/nfdump
private or public network of an organization or elsewhere the
Internet. Our assumption is the true pivoting does not involve
all the actors from the same network. The prime example of
true pivoting involves a source from the Internet, pivot in the
public network of an organization, and target inside such a
network, as presented in Section III. Thus, we will check
the locations of the actors and inspect the directions of the
suspected pivoting activities.
B. Manually identifying intrinsic features
The discovery of phenomena similar to pivoting should
eliminate candidates that are explainable as a different activity
than pivoting but does not improve our understanding of
pivoting. In the next step, and to answer the second research
question, we need to identify the features of pivoting activity
that can be inferred from the candidates but are not reflected
in the existing detection method.
We will investigate the features discussed in the previous
subsection, this time with respect to the candidates appearing
to be true pivoting activities, such as the candidates with the
expected services and actor’s location. Subsequently, we will
count the occurrences of each IP address in the candidates
to check for frequent talkers and isolated events. Frequent
actors and their combinations may suggest a common non-
pivoting activity, and, thus, true pivoting is expected to be more
likely found in isolated events, i.e., candidates with rather a
unique set of actors. Finally, an interesting feature to focus
on is the volume and the duration of the transferred data. If a
true pivoting propagates a command or data, it should display
similar NetFlow features, such as the number of bytes and
packets transferred and the duration of the flow.
Our experiences and expectation in identifying suspected
pivoting activities suggest the following critical features:
• S, P, T Count are the numbers of pivoting candidates
that share the same S, P , or T (e.g., the pivot count of
a candidate X is the number of candidates in which the
pivot’s IP address is the same as in X, including X).
• S, P, T Locations is the label given to IP addresses
that describes their location with respect to the monitored
network. The ’Private’ tag is assigned to privately routed
IP addresses in the network (e.g., 10.0.0.0/8), the tag
“Public” or “Internal” is given to publicly addressable IP
addresses of the monitored network (e.g., 147.251.0.0/16
for Masaryk University network), and the tag “External”
is given to all the other IP addresses.
• Duration, In/Out Packets, In/Out Bytes, Flows ratios
are the ratios of the biflow feature values. The value of
each feature in the first biflow (source to pivot) is divided
by the value in the second flow (from pivot to target).
C. Automatically identifying intrinsic features
Our research here is to move the time-consuming prac-
tices towards a generalizable machine learning approach. The
contextually meaningful features that we identify are being
examined with statistical correlation and Principal Component
Analysis (PCA) methods. Using the Kaiser criterion, we will
select the principal components with eigenvalue > 1 and set
the number of principal components needed to identify true
pivoting. The eigenvectors of the principal components will
illustrate the weight of the candidate features in the process.
Further, the Pearson linear correlation coefficient calculates
the covariance of two vectors and divides them by the product
of their standard deviations ρx,y =
cov(x,y)
σxσy
. The result is
a number ranging from −1 ≤ ρx,y ≤ 1, which represents
the strength and direction of the correlation between the
two vectors. By determining the Pearson correlation between
attributes and the label, we can better understand which
individual features may be indicative of suspected true pivoting
flows.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Herein, we present the results of the experiment. First, we
comment on the measurements and candidate detection. The
findings of manual inspection of pivoting candidates follow.
Subsequently, we present the results of principal component
analysis and comment on feature correlation.
A. Pivoting Candidate Detection
The experiment took place in the campus network of
Masaryk University that uses NetFlow probes located at vari-
ous observation points. The hosts in the campus network use
mostly public IP addresses (/16 IPv4 and /48 IPv6 range),
but certain infrastructures are addressed by private IPv4 range
accessible only from within the campus network. We used the
NetFlow [8] data from a probe located near a server segment,
where we expect to capture the most interesting examples of
pivoting, namely the pivoting from public to private IP range
and vice versa with servers as pivots. The network traffic of
personal computers connected to the university’s VPN and Wi-
Fi is also visible to the NetFlow probe and, thus, we also have
a chance to inspect the behavior of personal computers in the
network.
B. Investigation of Pivoting Candidates
The HTTP(S) traffic is dominant and deserves further inves-
tigation. We found 133 pivoting candidates on SSH, which is
one of the services we expected to display pivoting characteris-
tics that could be malicious and is worth detailed investigation.
Unfortunately, no pivoting candidates were found with the
TCP port 3389, on which the RDP service is running. Probably
there were no RDP servers active in the monitored network
segment at the time of the measurement. The other destination
ports indicate legitimate traffic that is similar to pivoting. The
discussion on particular ports and services follows. We did
not find any pivots that would enable pivoting on more ports
simultaneously. We only found ten cases in which the pivoting
candidates differed only in the protocol used; the actors used
port 51413 over both TCP and UDP.
A large portion of pivoting candidates was observed on
ports that would indicate explainable, benign network traffic
that only resembles pivoting and, thus, could be considered as
false positives. First, we observed a number of pivoting-like
Table I
TRUE AND FALSE POSITIVE PIVOTING CANDIDATES.
False positives
HTTP(S) 70,312
other services - DNS, SMTP, NTP 12,714
p2p - BitTorrent, VoIP, online gaming 7,615
SSH 120
True pivoting SSH 13
Total 90,774
events in which known servers acted as pivots. Namely, in the
DNS and SMTP traffic, we can see traffic patterns similar to
pivoting. In DNS, a server receives a request from a client,
and if an appropriate record is not found at the server, the
server queries a different server. In SMTP, a server receives
an email from a client and relays it to a different server. Both
activities are very similar to pivoting and are correctly detected
by the detection method. However, they are very common, and
no suspicious candidates were found. Thus, we can proclaim
such candidates as benign. Second, we found a number of
candidates in which only the personal computers served as
pivots. Most often, we found a pivoting-like activity on ports
associated with BitTorrent and online gaming. In such cases,
a host running a BitTorrent client or an online game initiates
and receives a lot of connections at the same time, which
may be detected as pivoting. The NetFlow characteristics
of such activities are very similar to pivoting. However, no
suspicious candidates were found, and the candidates may
be proclaimed as false positives. The same also applies to
VoIP, instant messaging, NTP, and other services based on
p2p communication, which were also detected, but mostly
with only a few candidates or pivots. The NAT traversal on
UDP port 4500 enables the host connected to VPN to use
p2p or VoIP and, thus, should be mentioned here as well.
Finally, we identified a number of pivoting candidates and
corresponding ports that are not easily explainable, mostly
because the port number, e.g., 15001, is not well known. In
such cases, often only one pivot and a few hosts in the campus
network were involved in such traffic patterns, and, thus, it is
most likely a legitimate network service. Some of the pivots
were identified as back-up servers, cloud management servers,
and other legitimate services. Such candidates can also be
proclaimed as benign or false positives.
When analyzing pivoting candidates that used TCP port 22
(SSH), we identified seven distinct pivots, 3 benign and 4
suspicious. Each benign pivot initiated a connection with only
one other known host, e.g., a back-up machine or a GitHub
repository. Such connections appeared throughout the day and
were often long-term. Thus, any incoming connection (e.g., a
one-time brute-force password attack from the Internet) to a
suspected pivot could cause the detection algorithm to connect
it to a long-term activity and regard both flows as pivoting. The
true pivots either appeared to be pivoting a connection from
the Internet via the campus network to another host on the
Internet or from the campus network via a host on the Internet
to the campus network. We found 13 pivoting candidates with
4 unique pivots like this and used them as examples of true
pivoting. We can infer a heuristic out of these observations -
a true pivoting activity is the one in which the pivot and the
remaining actors are from different parts of the network (e.g.,
internal network and the Internet).
The candidates using HTTP(S) seem to be mostly benign
and can be explained as common benign behavior of the
protocol. The actors, namely pivots and targets, are mostly
well-known HTTP(S) servers from the campus network or
world-wide. However, due to the prevalence of HTTP(S)
traffic in today’s network and its popularity among users and
attackers, it is not reasonable to declare it all as benign.
Malicious pivoting activity may use HTTP(S) ports either in
relation to a web-based attack or as the primary choice of
an attacker when bypassing firewalls. Thus, we recommend
further investigation as future work, possibly using an auto-
mated method due to the number of candidates. Further, the
extended NetFlow monitoring with HTTP header parsing [20]
or TLS analysis [21] might be helpful in identifying true or
even suspicious pivoting.
C. Feature Correlation for Suspicious Flows
The linear correlation between numerical features and the
suspicious label was measured to investigate if any individual
attributes are possibly related to whether a flow is suspicious or
not. Figure 2 shows the absolute value of Pearson measure-
ments for a selection of attributes, representing the strength
of correlation between each individual attribute and the label.
Target and pivot counts as well as Duration12 show a strong
correlation, though these are the only notable examples. All
other numerical attributes have very weak correlations similar
to InPackets23 and OutBytesRatio. It must be noted, though,
that it is not expected that the individual attributes would
have strong linear relationships to the label. The categorical
attributes may also play a critical role in predicting suspicious
flows. There should also exist relationships between groups of
attributes that more strongly relate to a flow being suspicious.
PCA can give a deeper understanding of the overall feature
space by finding such relationships.
D. Principal Component Analysis
We used the SSH pivoting candidates and processed them
using the Principal Component Analysis (PCA). This is a
known machine learning method that is appreciated for the
analysis of network traffic [19], [22].
Out of all the port numbers and services, the SSH can-
didates were the most suitable for investigating which are
false positives and which could be true pivoting (benign or
malicious). Out of 133 candidates, 13 were marked as True
and the remaining 120 as False, following the investigation
discussed previously. We run PCA using the features listed in
Section IV-B and the “suspicious” flag as the target.
Using the cumulative proportion, we determine the amount
of variance that the principal components explain. With future
analyses in mind, we want to have at least 90% of the variance
2Duration of the candidate’s first flow.
3InPackets value of the candidate’s second flow.






Figure 2. Bar Chart Showing Pearson Linear Correlation Coefficient Between
Suspicious Label and Attributes.
explained, which corresponds to five principal components.
Similarly, using the Kaiser criterion (selecting principal com-
ponents with eigenvalues > 1), we get the same result. The
eigenvalues and eigenvectors are presented in Table II.
PCA shows several interesting associations of principal
components with features. The most apparent is the positive
association with “Internal” S and T and “External” pivot in
the first vector. The second vector shows negative associations
for the combination of “External” S and T and “Internal” P ,
which suggests that both combinations are interesting. There
is also a strong negative association with “count” features,
namely with P count and T count. The “ratio” features did
not show any strong associations except for a few values in
the second and third vector. However, that might be caused
by the low number of true positive candidates we were able
to collect. Nevertheless, the “location” and “count” features
turned out to be highly interesting.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Accurate detection of pivoting activities is of paramount
importance to protect modern network environments. Existing
proposals work only under specific circumstances and cannot
be reliably applied in realistic settings, generating overwhelm-
ing numbers of false positives. This paper addresses this
issue. We perform a comprehensive analysis of the results
obtained by applying state of the art methods, with the goal
of identifying a practical and effective way to automatically
reduce the number of false pivoting detections. We do so by
formulating and answering three research questions.
First, we focus on networking activities that are similar to
pivoting and may raise false positive alerts. It was shown
above that various p2p networking (e.g., BitTorrent) and
several common protocols (e.g., SMTP, DNS) display similar
characteristics as pivoting and also represent the vast majority
of the detected candidates. True pivoting occurs only with the
SSH traffic. Unfortunately, we did not observe any Telnet or
RDP traffic that could also include pivoting. Then, we focus
on identifying the unique traits exhibited by true pivoting
activities. We show that the most significant traits include the
location (e.g., inside or outside the monitored network) and
Table II
EIGENVALUES AND EIGENVECTORS OF PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS.
Eigenvalues
Eigenvalue 4.15755 2.36467 2.00138 1.36928 1.07673 0.86379
Proportion 0.34646 0.19706 0.16678 0.11411 0.08973 0.07198
Cummulative 0.34646 0.54352 0.7103 0.82441 0.91413 0.98612
Eigenvectors
S location=Internal 0.4271 -0.2369 0.0053 0.2051 0.1684 -0.155
S count -0.2547 -0.3806 -0.005 0.1136 0.3858 0.3973
P location=External 0.4271 -0.2369 0.0053 0.2051 0.1684 -0.155
P count -0.4106 -0.0511 0.0033 0.3107 0.3059 -0.2268
T location=Internal 0.4271 -0.2369 0.0053 0.2051 0.1684 -0.155
T count -0.3988 -0.0586 0.0035 0.3204 0.3281 -0.269
Duration ratio -0.068 0.2496 0.0036 0.5616 -0.4721 -0.3759
In Packets ratio -0.0811 -0.285 -0.6018 -0.0888 -0.1743 -0.113
Out Packets ratio -0.145 -0.4729 0.342 -0.1523 -0.2855 -0.182
In Bytes ratio -0.0787 -0.2516 -0.6247 -0.079 -0.1436 -0.1146
Out Bytes ratio -0.1482 -0.461 0.3611 -0.1522 -0.2767 -0.1846
Flows ratio 0.0029 -0.1943 -0.0049 0.5346 -0.3646 0.6418
the uniqueness of the actors (i.e., how often they appear in
the detected candidates). Finally, to facilitate the reduction of
false positives, we apply PCA to automatically infer the true
pivoting features.
Our findings pave the way to future work, where we aim
to create an efficient detector of pivoting candidates. Such a
detector would allow the development of more refined methods
to counter the threat posed by malicious pivoting activities to
modern organizations.
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